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Abstract
This paper proposes an alternative language for expressing results of
the algorithmic theory of randomness. The language is more precise in
that it does not involve unspecified additive or multiplicative constants,
making mathematical results, in principle, applicable in practice. Our
main testing ground for the proposed language is the problem of defining
Bernoulli sequences, which was of great interest to Andrei Kolmogorov
and his students.
The version of this paper at http://alrw.net (Working Paper 25) is
updated most often.
1 Introduction
There has been a great deal of criticism of the notion of p-value lately, and in
particular, Glenn Shafer [16] defended the use of betting scores instead. This
paper refers to betting scores as e-values and demonstrates their advantages
by establishing results that become much more precise when they are stated in
terms of e-values instead of p-values.
Both p-values and e-values have been used, albeit somewhat implicitly, in the
algorithmic theory of randomness: Martin-Lo¨f’s tests of algorithmic randomness
[14] are an algorithmic version of p-functions (i.e., functions producing p-values
[5]) while Levin’s tests of algorithmic randomness [12, 2] are an algorithmic
version of e-functions (this is the term we will use in this paper for functions
producing e-values). Levin’s tests are a natural modification of Martin-Lo¨f’s
tests leading to simpler mathematical results; similarly, many mathematical
results stated in terms of p-values become simpler when stated in terms of e-
values.
The algorithmic theory of randomness is a powerful source of intuition, but
strictly speaking, its results are not applicable in practice since they always
involve unspecified additive or multiplicative constants. The goal of this paper
is to explore ways of obtaining results that are more precise; in particular, results
that may be applicable in practice. The price to pay is that our results may
involve more quantifiers (usually hidden in our notation) and, therefore, their
statements may at first appear less intuitive.
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In Section 2 we define p-functions and e-functions in the context of testing
simple statistical hypotheses, explore relations between them, and explain the
intuition behind them. In Section 3 we generalize these definitions, results, and
explanations to testing composite statistical hypotheses.
Section 4 is devoted to testing in Bayesian statistics and gives non-
algorithmic results that are particularly clean and intuitive. They will be
used as technical tools later in the paper. In Section 5 these results are slightly
extended and then applied to clarifying the difference between statistical ran-
domness and exchangeability. (In this paper we use “statistical randomness”
to refer to being produced by an IID probability measure; there will always be
either “algorithmic” or “statistical” standing next to “randomness” in order to
distinguish between the two meanings.)
Section 6 explores the question of defining Bernoulli sequences, which was
of great interest to Kolmogorov [7], Martin-Lo¨f [14], and Kolmogorov’s other
students. Kolmogorov defined Bernoulli sequences as exchangeable sequences,
but we will see that another natural definition is narrower than exchangeability.
Kolmogorov paid particular attention to algorithmic randomness w.r. to uni-
form probability measures on finite sets. On one hand, he believed that his no-
tion of algorithmic randomness in this context “can be regarded as definitive”
[9], and on the other hand, he never seriously suggested any generalizations
of this notion (and never endorsed generalizations proposed by his students).
In Section 6 we state a simple result in this direction that characterizes the
difference between Bernoulliness and exchangeability.
In Sections 4 and 6 we state our results first in terms of e-functions and then
p-functions. Results in terms of e-functions are always simpler and cleaner,
supporting Glenn Shafer’s recommendation in [16] to use betting scores more
widely.
Remark 1. There is no standard terminology for what we call e-values and
e-functions. In addition to Shafer’s use of “betting scores” for our e-values,
• Gru¨nwald et al. [4] refer to e-values as “s-values” (“s” for “safe”),
• and Gammerman and Vovk [3] refer to the inverses of e-values as “i-values”
(“i” for “integral”).
No formal knowledge of the algorithmic theory of randomness will be as-
sumed in this paper; the reader can safely ignore all comparisons between our
results and results of the algorithmic theory of randomness.
Notation
Our notation will be mostly standard or defined at the point where it is first used.
If F is a class of [0,∞]-valued functions on some set Ω and g : [0,∞]→ [0,∞] is a
function, we let g(F) stand for the set of all compositions g(f) = g◦f , f ∈ F (i.e,
g is applied to F element-wise). We will also use obvious modifications of this
definition: e.g., 0.5F−0.5 would be interpreted as g(F), where g(u) := 0.5u−0.5
for u ∈ [0,∞].
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2 Testing simple statistical hypotheses
Let P be a probability measure on a measurable space Ω. A p-function [5] is
a measurable function f : Ω → [0, 1] such that, for any ǫ > 0, P{f ≤ ǫ} ≤ ǫ.
An e-function is a measurable function f : Ω → [0,∞] such that
∫
f dP ≤ 1.
(E-functions have been promoted in [16], [4], and [17, Section 11.5], but using
different terminology.)
Let PP be the class of all p-functions and EP be the class of all e-functions,
where the underlying measure P is shown as subscript. We can define p-values
and e-values as values taken by p-functions and e-functions, respectively. The
intuition behind p-values and e-values will be discussed later in this section.
The following is an algorithm-free version of the standard relation (see, e.g.,
[13, Lemma 4.3.5]) between Martin-Lo¨f’s and Levin’s algorithmic notions of
randomness deficiency.
Proposition 2. For any probability measure P and κ ∈ (0, 1),
κPκ−1P ⊆ EP ⊆ P
−1
P . (1)
Proof. The right inclusion in (1) follows from the Markov inequality: if f is an
e-function,
P{f−1 ≤ ǫ} = P{f ≥ 1/ǫ} ≤ ǫ.
The left inclusion in (1) follows from [17, Section 11.5]. The value of
the constant in front of the Pκ−1P on the left-hand side of (1) follows from∫ 1
0 p
κ−1 dp = 1/κ.
Both p-functions and e-functions can be used for testing statistical hypothe-
ses. In this section we only discuss simple statistical hypotheses, i.e., probability
measures. Observing a large e-value or a small p-value w.r. to a simple statistical
hypothesis P entitles us to rejecting P as the source of the observed data, pro-
vided the e-function or p-function were chosen in advance. The e-value can be
interpreted as the amount of evidence against P found by our chosen e-function.
Similarly, the p-value reflects the amount of evidence against P on a different
scale; small p-values reflect a large amount of evidence against P .
Remark 3. Proposition 2 tells us that using p-values and using e-values are
equivalent, on a rather crude scale. Roughly, a p-value of p corresponds to an
e-value of 1/p. The right inclusion in (2) says that any way of producing e-
values e can be translated into a way of producing p-values 1/e. On the other
hand, the left inclusion in (2) says that any way of producing p-values p can
be translated into a way of producing e-values κpκ−1 ≈ 1/p, where the “≈”
assumes that we are interested in the asymptotics as p→ 0, κ > 0 is small, and
we ignore positive constant factors (as customary in the algorithmic theory of
randomness).
Remark 4. Proposition 2 can be greatly strengthened, under the assumptions
of Remark 3. For example, we can replace (1) by
Hκ(PP ) ⊆ EP ⊆ P
−1
P ,
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where
Hκ(v) :=


∞ if v = 0
κ(1 + κ)κv−1(− ln v)−1−κ if v ∈ (0, e−1−κ]
0 if v ∈ (e−1−κ, 1]
(2)
and κ ∈ (0,∞) (see [17, Section 11.1]). The value of the coefficient κ(1+ κ)κ in
(2) follows from
∫ e−1−κ
0
v−1(− ln v)−1−κ dv =
1
κ(1 + κ)κ
.
3 Testing composite statistical hypotheses
Let Ω be a measurable space, which we will refer to as our sample space, and Θ be
another measurable space (our parameter space). We say that P = (Pθ | θ ∈ Θ)
is a statistical model on Ω if P is a Markov kernel with source Θ and target
Ω: each Pθ is a probability measure on Ω, and for each measurable A ⊆ Ω, the
function Pθ(A) of θ ∈ Θ is measurable.
The notions of an e-function and a p-function each split in two. We are
usually really interested only in the outcome ω, while the parameter θ is an
auxiliary modelling tool. This motivates the following pair of simpler definitions.
A measurable function f : Ω → [0,∞] is an e-function w.r. to the statistical
model P (which is our composite statistical hypothesis in this context) if
∀θ ∈ Θ :
∫
Ω
f(ω)Pθ(dω) ≤ 1.
In other words, if P ∗(f) ≤ 1, where P ∗ is the upper envelope
P ∗(f) := sup
θ∈Θ
∫
f(ω)Pθ(dω) (3)
(in Bourbaki’s [1, IX.1.1] terminology, P ∗ is an encumbrance provided the inte-
gral in (3) is understood as the upper integral). Similarly, a measurable function
f : Ω→ [0, 1] is a p-function w.r. to the statistical model P if, for any ǫ > 0,
∀θ ∈ Θ : Pθ{ω ∈ Ω | f(ω) ≤ ǫ} ≤ ǫ.
In other words, if, for any ǫ > 0, P ∗(1{f≤ǫ}) ≤ ǫ.
Let EP be the class of all e-functions w.r. to the statistical model P , and PP
be the class of all p-functions w.r. to P . We can easily generalize Proposition 2
(the proof stays the same).
Proposition 5. For any statistical model P and κ ∈ (0, 1),
κPκ−1P ⊆ EP ⊆ P
−1
P .
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For f ∈ EP , we regard the e-value f(ω) as the amount of evidence against
the statistical model P found by f (which must be chosen in advance) when the
outcome is ω. The interpretation of p-values is similar.
In some case we would like to take the parameter θ into account more se-
riously. A measurable function f : Ω × Θ → [0,∞] is a conditional e-function
w.r. to the statistical model P if
∀θ ∈ Θ :
∫
Ω
f(ω; θ)Pθ(dω) ≤ 1.
Let E¯P be the class of all such functions. And a measurable function f : Ω×Θ→
[0, 1] is a conditional p-function w.r. to P if
∀ǫ > 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ : Pθ {ω ∈ Ω | f(ω; θ) ≤ ǫ} ≤ ǫ.
Let P¯P be the class of all such functions.
We can embed EP (resp. PP ) into E¯P (resp. P¯P ) by identifying a function f
on domain Ω with the function f ′ on domain Ω × Θ that does not depend on
θ ∈ Θ, f ′(ω; θ) := f(ω).
For f ∈ E¯P , we can regard f(ω; θ) as the amount of evidence against the
specific probability measure Pθ in the statistical model P found by f when the
outcome is ω.
We can generalize Proposition 5 further as follows.
Proposition 6. For any statistical model P and κ ∈ (0, 1),
κP¯κ−1P ⊆ E¯P ⊆ P¯
−1
P . (4)
Remarks 3 and 4 are also applicable in the context of Propositions 5 and 6.
4 The validity of Bayesian statistics
In this section we establish the validity of Bayesian statistics in our framework,
mainly as a sanity check. We will translate the results in [24], which are stated
in terms of the algorithmic theory of randomness, to our algorithm-free setting.
It is interesting that the proofs simplify radically, and become almost obvious.
(And remarkably, one statement also simplifies.)
Let P = (Pθ | θ ∈ Θ) be a statistical model, as in the previous section, and
Q be a probability measure on the parameter space Θ. Together, P and Q form
a Bayesian model, and Q is known as the prior measure in this context.
The joint probability measure T on the measurable space Ω × Θ is defined
by
T (A×B) :=
∫
B
Pθ(A)Q(dθ),
for all measurable A ⊆ Ω and B ⊆ Θ. Let Y be the marginal distribution of T
on Ω: for any measurable A ⊆ Ω, Y (A) := T (A×Θ).
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The product E¯PEQ of E¯P and EQ is defined as the class of all measurable
functions f : Ω×Θ→ [0,∞] such that, for some g ∈ E¯P and h ∈ EQ,
f(ω, θ) = g(ω; θ)h(θ) T -a.s. (5)
Such f can be regarded as ways of finding evidence against (ω, θ) being produced
by the Bayesian model (P,Q): to have evidence against (ω, θ) being produced by
(P,Q) we need to have evidence against θ being produced by the prior measure
Q or evidence against ω being produced by Pθ; we combine the last two amounts
of evidence by multiplying them. The following proposition tells us that this
product is precisely the amount of evidence against T found by a suitable e-
function.
Proposition 7. If (Pθ | θ ∈ Θ) is a statistical model with a prior probability
measure Q on Θ, and T is the joint probability measure on Ω×Θ, then
ET = E¯PEQ. (6)
Proposition 7 will be deduced from Theorem 14 in Section 5. It is the
analogue of Theorem 1 in [24], which says, in the terminology of that paper,
that the level of impossibility of a pair (θ, ω) w.r. to the joint probability measure
T is the product of the level of impossibility of θ w.r. to the prior measure Q
and the level of impossibility of ω w.r. to the probability measure Pθ. In an
important respect, however, Proposition 7 is simpler than Theorem 1 in [24]:
in the latter, the level of impossibility of ω w.r. to Pθ has to be conditional on
the level of impossibility of θ w.r. to Q, whereas in the former there is no such
conditioning. Besides, Proposition 7 is more precise: it does not involve any
constant factors (specified or otherwise).
Remark 8. The non-algorithmic formula (6) being simpler than its counterpart
in the algorithmic theory of randomness is analogous to the non-algorithmic
formulaH(x, y) = H(x)+H(y | x) being simpler than its counterpartK(x, y) =
K(x)+K(y | x,K(x)) in the algorithmic theory of complexity, H being entropy
and K being prefix complexity. The fact that K(x, y) does not coincide with
K(x)+K(y | x) to within an additive constant,K being Kolmogorov complexity,
was surprising to Kolmogorov and wasn’t noticed for several years [6, 7].
The inf-projection onto Ω of an e-function f ∈ ET w.r. to T is the function
(projinfΩ f) : Ω→ [0,∞] defined by(
projinfΩ f
)
(ω) := inf
θ∈Θ
f(ω, θ).
Intuitively, projinfΩ f regards ω as typical under the model if it can be extended
to a typical (ω, θ) for at least one θ. Let projinfΩ ET be the set of all such inf-
projections.
The results in the rest of this section become simpler if the definitions of
classes E and P are modified slightly: we drop the condition of measurability
on their elements and replace all integrals by upper integrals and all measures
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by outer measures. We will use the modified definitions only in the rest of this
section (we could have used them in the whole of this paper, but they become
particularly useful here since projections of measurable functions do not have
to be measurable [18]).
Proposition 9. If T is a probability measure on Ω× Θ and Y is its marginal
distribution on Ω,
EY = proj
inf
Ω ET . (7)
Proof. To check the inclusion “⊆” in (7), let g ∈ EY , i.e.,
∫
g(ω)Y (dω) ≤ 1.
Setting f(ω, θ) := g(ω), we have
∫
f(ω, θ)T (dω, dθ) ≤ 1 (i.e., f ∈ ET ) and g is
the inf-projection of f onto Ω.
To check the inclusion “⊇” in (7), let f ∈ ET and g := proj
inf
Ω f . We then
have ∫
g(ω)Y (dω) =
∫
g(ω)T (dω, dθ) ≤
∫
f(ω, θ)T (dω, dθ) ≤ 1.
Proposition 9 says that we can acquire evidence against an outcome ω being
produced by the Bayesian model (P,Q) if and only if we can acquire evidence
against (ω, θ) being produced by the model for all θ ∈ Θ.
We can combine Propositions 7 and 9 obtaining
EY = proj
inf
Ω
(
E¯PEQ
)
.
The rough interpretation is that we can acquire evidence against ω being pro-
duced by Y if and only if we can, for each θ ∈ Θ, acquire evidence against θ
being produced by Q or acquire evidence against ω being produced by Pθ.
The following statements in terms of p-values are cruder, but their interpre-
tation is similar.
Corollary 10. If κ ∈ (0, 1) and (P,Q) is a Bayesian model,
κ−1P1−κT ⊆ P¯PPQ ⊆ κ
2
1−κP
1
1−κ
T .
Proof. We can rewrite (4) in Proposition 6 as
κ−1P¯1−κP ⊆ E¯
−1
P ⊆ P¯P
and as
E¯−1P ⊆ P¯P ⊆ κ
1
1−κ E¯
− 1
1−κ
P ,
with similar representations for (2) in Proposition 2 and (5) in Proposition 5.
Therefore, by (6) in Proposition 7,
κ−1P1−κT ⊆ E
−1
T = (E¯P EQ)
−1 = E¯−1P E
−1
Q ⊆ P¯PPQ
and
P¯PPQ ⊆ κ
2
1−κ
(
E¯PEQ
)− 1
1−κ = κ
2
1−κ E
− 1
1−κ
T ⊆ κ
2
1−κP
1
1−κ
T .
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Corollary 11. If κ ∈ (0, 1), T is a probability measure on Ω×Θ, and Y is its
marginal distribution on Ω,
κ−1 projsupΩ P
1−κ
T ⊆ PY ⊆ κ
1
1−κ projsupΩ P
1
1−κ
T ,
where projsupΩ is defined similarly to proj
inf
Ω (with sup in place of inf).
Proof. As in the proof of Corollary 10, we have
κ−1 projsupΩ P
1−κ
T ⊆ proj
sup
Ω E
−1
T = E
−1
Y ⊆ PY
and
PY ⊆ κ
1
1−κ E
− 1
1−κ
Y = κ
1
1−κ projsupΩ E
− 1
1−κ
T ⊆ κ
1
1−κ projsupΩ P
1
1−κ
T .
5 Parametric Bayesian models
Now we generalize the notion of a Bayesian model to that of a parametric
Bayesian (or para-Bayesian) model. This is a pair consisting of a statistical
model (Pθ | θ ∈ Θ) on a sample space Ω and a statistical model (Qπ | π ∈ Π) on
the sample space Θ (so that the sample space of the second statistical model is
the parameter space of the first statistical model). Intuitively, a para-Bayesian
model is the counterpart of a Bayesian model in the situation of uncertainty
about the prior: now the prior is a parametric family of probability measures
rather than one probability measure.
The following definitions are straightforward generalizations of the defini-
tions for the Bayesian case. The joint statistical model T = (Tπ | π ∈ Π) on the
measurable space Ω×Θ is defined by
Tπ(A×B) :=
∫
B
Pθ(A)Qπ(dθ), (8)
for all measurable A ⊆ Ω and B ⊆ Θ. For each π ∈ Π, Yπ is the marginal
distribution of Tπ on Ω: for any measurable A ⊆ Ω, Yπ(A) := Tπ(A × Θ).
The product E¯PEQ of E¯P and EQ is still defined as the class of all measurable
functions f : Ω× Θ → [0,∞] such that, for some g ∈ E¯P and h ∈ EQ, we have
the equality in (5) Tπ-a.s., for all π ∈ Π.
Remark 12. Another representation of para-Bayesian models is as a sufficient
statistic, as elaborated in [11]:
• For the para-Bayesian model (P,Q), the statistic (θ, ω) ∈ (Θ × Ω) 7→ θ
is a sufficient statistic in the statistical model (Tπ) on the product space
Θ× Ω.
• If θ is a sufficient statistic for a statistical model (Tπ) on a sample space
Ω, then (P,Q) is a para-Bayesian model, where Q is the distribution of θ,
and Pθ are (fixed versions of) the conditional distributions given θ.
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Remark 13. Yet another way to represent a para-Bayesian model (P,Q) is a
Markov family with time horizon 3:
• the initial state space is Π, the middle one is Θ, and the final one is Ω;
• there is no initial probability measure on Π, the statistical model (Qπ)
is the first Markov kernel, and the statistical model (Pθ) is the second
Markov kernel.
Theorem 14. If (P,Q) is a para-Bayesian model with the joint statistical model
T (as defined by (8)), we have (6).
Proof. The inclusion “⊇” in (6) follows from the definition of T : if g ∈ E¯P and
h ∈ EQ, we have, for all π ∈ Π,∫
Ω×Θ
g(ω; θ)h(θ)Tπ(dω, dθ) =
∫
Θ
∫
Ω
g(ω; θ)Pθ(dω)h(θ)Qπ(dθ)
≤
∫
Θ
h(θ)Qπ(dθ) ≤ 1.
To check the inclusion “⊆” in (6), let f ∈ ET . Define h : Θ → [0,∞] and
g : Ω×Θ→ [0,∞] by
h(θ) :=
∫
f(ω, θ)Pθ(dω)
g(ω; θ) := f(ω, θ)/h(θ)
(setting, e.g., 0/0 := 0 in the last fraction). Since by definition, f(ω, θ) =
g(ω; θ)h(θ) Tπ-a.s., it suffices to check that h ∈ EQ and g ∈ E¯P . The inclusion
h ∈ EQ follows from the fact that, for any π ∈ Π,∫
Θ
h(θ)Qπ(dθ) =
∫
Θ
∫
Ω
f(ω, θ)Pθ(dω)Qπ(dθ) =
∫
Ω×Θ
f(ω, θ)Tπ(dω, dθ) ≤ 1.
And the inclusion g ∈ E¯P follows from the fact that, for any θ ∈ Θ,
∫
g(ω; θ)Pθ(dω) =
∫
f(ω, θ)
h(θ)
Pθ(dω) =
∫
f(ω, θ)Pθ(dω)
h(θ)
=
h(θ)
h(θ)
≤ 1
(we have ≤ 1 rather than = 1 because of the possibility h(θ) = 0).
IID vs exchangeability
De Finetti’s theorem (see, e.g., [15, Theorem 1.49]) establishes a close connection
between IID and exchangeability for infinite sequences in Z∞, where Z is a
Borel measurable space: namely, the exchangeable probability measures are
the convex mixtures of the IID probability measures (in particular, their upper
envelopes, and therefore, e- and p-functions, coincide). This subsection discusses
a somewhat less close connection in the case of sequences of a fixed finite length.
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FixN ∈ {1, 2, . . .} (time horizon), and let Ω := ZN be the set of all sequences
of elements of Z (a measurable space, not necessarily Borel) of length N . An IID
probability measure on Ω is a measure of the type QN , where Q is a probability
measure on Z. The configuration conf(ω) of a sequence ω ∈ Ω is the multiset
of all elements of ω, and a configuration measure is the pushforward of an IID
probability measure on Ω under the mapping conf. Therefore, a configuration
measure is a measure on the set of all multisets in Z of size N (with the natural
quotient σ-algebra).
Let Eiid be the class of all e-functions w.r. to the family of all IID probability
measures on Ω and Econf be the class of all e-functions w.r. to the family of
all configuration probability measures. Let Eexch be the class of all e-functions
w.r. to the family of all exchangeable probability measures on Ω; remember
that a probability measure P on Ω is exchangeable if, for any permutation
π : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N} and any measurable set E ⊆ ZN ,
P
{
(z1, . . . , zN) | (zπ(1), . . . , zπ(N)) ∈ E
}
= P (E).
The product EexchEconf of Eexch and Econf is the set of all measurable functions
f : Ω→ [0,∞] such that, for some g ∈ Eexch and h ∈ Econf ,
f(ω) = g(ω)h(conf(ω))
holds for almost all ω ∈ Ω (under any IID probability measure).
Corollary 15. It is true that
Eiid = EexchEconf .
Proof. It suffices to apply Theorem 14 in the situation where Θ is the set of
all configurations, Pθ is the probability measure on Z
N concentrated on the
set of all sequences with the configuration θ and uniform on that set (we can
order θ arbitrarily, and then Pθ assigns weight 1/N ! to each permutation of
that ordering), Π is the set of all IID probability measures on Ω, and Qπ is the
pushforward of π ∈ Π w.r. to the mapping conf.
6 Bernoulli sequences: IID vs exchangeability
In this section we apply the definitions and results of the previous sections to
the problem of defining Bernoulli sequences. Kolmogorov’s main publications
on this topic are [7] and [8]. The results of this section will be algorithm-free
versions of the results in [19] (also described in V’yugin’s review [25], Sections
11–13).
The definitions of the previous subsection simplify as follows. Now Ω :=
{0, 1}N is the set of all binary sequences of length N . Let EBern be the class of
all e-functions w.r. to the family of all Bernoulli IID probability measures on Ω
(this is a special case of Eiid) and Ebin be the class of all e-functions w.r. to the
family of all binomial probability measures on {0, . . . , N} (this is a special case
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of Econf); remember that the Bernoulli measure Bp with parameter p ∈ [0, 1]
is defined by Bp({ω}) := p
k(1 − p)N−k, where k := +ω is the number of 1s
in ω, and the binomial measure binp with parameter p ∈ [0, 1] is defined by
binp({k}) :=
(
N
k
)
pk(1 − p)N−k. (The notation +ω for the number k of 1s in ω
is motivated by k being the sum of the elements of ω.)
We continue to use the notation Eexch for the class of all e-functions w.r. to
the family of all exchangeable probability measures on Ω; a probability measure
P on Ω is exchangeable if and only if P ({ω}) depends on ω only via +ω. It
is clear that a function f : Ω → [0,∞] is in Eexch if and only if, for each
k ∈ {0, . . . , N}, (
N
k
)−1 ∑
ω∈Ω:+ω=k
f(ω) ≤ 1.
The product EexchEbin of Eexch and Ebin is the set of all functions ω ∈ Ω 7→
g(ω)h(+ω) for g ∈ Eexch and h ∈ Ebin. The following is a special case of
Corollary 15.
Corollary 16. It is true that
EBern = EexchEbin.
The intuition behind Corollary 16 is that a sequence ω ∈ Ω is Bernoulli
if and only if it is exchangeable and the number of 1s in it is binomial. The
analogue of Corollary 16 in the algorithmic theory of randomness is Theorem 1
in [19], which says, using the terminology of that paper, that the Bernoulliness
deficiency of ω equals the binomiality deficiency of +ω plus the conditional
randomness deficiency of ω in the set of all sequences in {0, 1}N with +ω 1s
given the binomiality deficiency of +ω. Corollary 16 is simpler since it does not
involve any analogue of the condition “given the binomiality deficiency of +ω”.
Theorem 1 of [19] was generalized to the non-binary case in [22] (Theorem 3 of
[22], given without a proof, is an algorithmic analogue of Corollary 15).
Remark 17. Kolmogorov’s definition of Bernoulli sequences is via exchangeabil-
ity. We can regard this definition as an approximation to definitions taking into
account the binomiality of the number of 1s. In the paper [7] Kolmogorov uses
the word “approximately” when introducing his notion of Bernoulliness (p. 663,
lines 5–6 after the 4th displayed equation). However, it would be wrong to as-
sume that here he acknowledges disregarding the requirement that the number
of 1s should be binomial; this is not what he meant when he used the word
“approximately” [10].
The reason for Kolmogorov’s definition of Bernoulliness being different from
the definitions based on e-values and p-values is that +ω carries too much
information about ω; intuitively [20], +ω contains not only useful information
about the probability p of 1 but also noise. To reduce the amount of noise, we
will use an imperfect estimator of p. Set
p(a) := sin2
(
aN−1/2
)
, a = 1, . . . , N∗ − 1, N∗ :=
⌊π
2
N1/2
⌋
, (9)
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where ⌊·⌋ stands for integer part. Let E : {0, . . . , N} → [0, 1] be the estimator
of p defined by E(k) := p(a), where p(a) is the element of the set (9) that is
nearest to k/N among those satisfying p(a) ≤ k/N ; if such elements do not
exist, set E(k) := p(1).
Denote by A the partition of the set {0, . . . , N} into the subsets E−1(E(k)),
where k ∈ {0, . . . , N}. For any k ∈ {0, . . . , N}, A(k) := E−1(E(k)) denotes
the element of the partition A containing k. Let Esin be the class of all e-
functions w.r. to the statistical model {Uk | k ∈ {0, . . . , N}}, Uk being the
uniform probability measure on A(k). (This is a Kolmogorov-type statistical
model, consisting of uniform probability measures on finite sets; see, e.g., [23,
Section 4].)
Theorem 18. For some universal constant c > 0,
c−1Esin ⊆ Ebin ⊆ cEsin.
The analogue of Theorem 18 in the algorithmic theory of randomness is
Theorem 2 in [19], and the proof of Theorem 18 can be extracted from that of
Theorem 2 in [19] (details omitted).
Remark 19. Paper [19] uses a net slightly different from (9); (9) was introduced
in [20] and also used in [25].
In conclusion of this section, let us extract corollaries in terms of p-values
from Corollary 16 and Theorem 18; we will use the obvious notation PBern,
Pexch, and Pbin.
Corollary 20. For each κ ∈ (0, 1),
κ−1P1−κBern ⊆ PexchPbin ⊆ κ
2
1−κP
1
1−κ
Bern. (10)
Proof. Similarly to Corollary 10, the left inclusion of (10) follows from
κ−1P1−κBern ⊆ E
−1
Bern = E
−1
exchE
−1
bin ⊆ PexchPbin,
and the right inclusion of (10) follows from
PexchPbin ⊆ κ
2
1−κ (EexchEbin)
− 1
1−κ = κ
2
1−κ E
− 1
1−κ
Bern ⊆ κ
2
1−κP
1
1−κ
Bern.
Corollary 21. There is a universal constant c > 0 such that, for each κ ∈
(0, 0.9),
cκ−1P1−κsin ⊆ Pbin ⊆ c
−1κ
1
1−κP
1
1−κ
sin . (11)
Proof. As in the previous proof, the left inclusion of (11) follows from
κ−1P1−κsin ⊆ E
−1
sin ⊆ c
−1E−1bin ⊆ c
−1Pbin,
and the right inclusion from
Pbin ⊆ κ
1
1−κ E
− 1
1−κ
bin ⊆ c
−1κ
1
1−κ E
− 1
1−κ
sin ⊆ c
−1κ
1
1−κP
1
1−κ
sin ,
where c stands for a positive universal constant.
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7 Conclusion
In this section we discuss some directions of further research. A major advantage
of the non-algorithmic approach to randomness proposed in this paper is the
absence of unspecified constants; in principle, all constants can be computed.
The most obvious open problem is to find the best constant c in Theorem 18.
In Section 6 we discussed a possible implementation of Kolmogorov’s idea of
defining Bernoulli sequences. However, Kolmogorov’s idea was part of a wider
programme; e.g., in [8, Section 5] he sketches a way of applying a similar ap-
proach to Markov sequences. For other possible applications, see [23, Section 4]
(most of these applications were mentioned by Kolmogorov in his papers and
talks). Analogues of Corollary 16 in Section 6 can be established for these other
applications (cf. [11] and Remark 12), but it is not obvious whether Theorem 18
can be extended in a similar way.
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